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WATER, LEAD, AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE:
EASING THE FLINT WATER CRISIS WITH A PUBLIC
WATER CONTAMINATION LIABILITY FUND
JONATHON LUBRANO*
INTRODUCTION
On April 25, 2014, the city of Flint, Michigan switched water
sources from the Detroit Water and Sewage Department to the Flint
River.1 By the next month, residents were already complaining about
color and smell.2 It wasn’t until August 2014, four months after the
switch, that high levels of dangerous bacteria were detected, requiring
residents to boil their water before using it.3 By the beginning of 2015,
tests were registering high levels of lead and carcinogens.4 However, it
wasn’t until September 2015 that larger studies confirmed the problem
and detected higher rates of excessive lead levels in children.5 The mayor
declared a state of emergency that December, followed by President
Barack Obama the next month.6
The Flint water crisis has become a particularly salient issue
in American consciousness and environmental law.7 The problem of
* JD Candidate, William & Mary Law School, 2018; BS Policy Analysis & Management,
Cornell University, 2015. Graduate Research Fellow of the Virginia Coastal Policy Center.
The author would like to thank his family and friends for their unwavering support and
encouragement. He would also like to thank the staff of the William & Mary Envi-
ronmental Law and Policy Review—whose tireless efforts made this Note possible.
1 Merrit Kennedy, Lead-Laced Water In Flint: A Step-By-Step Look At The Makings Of






5 Kennedy, supra note 1.
6 Id.
7 E.g., Helen Marie Berg, When a Disaster Is Not a “Disaster” and Why that Title Matters
for Flint, STAN. ENVTL. L.J. (Mar. 28, 2016), http://journals.law.stanford.edu/stanford-en
vironmental-law-journal-elj/blog/when-disaster-not-disaster-and-why-title-matters-flint
[https://perma.cc/32CF-N2XE]; David Bailey, Lawsuit Filed over Student Exposure to Lead
in Flint, Michigan, Schools, REUTERS (Oct. 18, 2016, 3:50 PM), http://www.reuters.com
/article/us-michigan-water-idUSKCN12I2J8 [https://web.archive.org/web/*/http://www
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contaminated drinking water affects communities across the country;8
according to the National Resource Defense Council, $ 18 million people
used water systems with lead violations in 2015.9
The goals of this Note are to 1) identify the multiple contours
of the problem of contaminated water in Flint and other communities,
2) analyze the law surrounding these problems, 3) explore potential in-
dividualized policy solutions to each problem, and 4) recommend a
solution that optimally addresses each of these problems.
In pursuit of these goals, Parts I, II, and III identify and examine
three substantial issues present within the Flint water crisis, and the
relevant law involved in each. Part I examines sovereign immunity as a
barrier to recovery for those harmed by contaminated water. Part II
explores the externalities of awarding damages in citizen-plaintiff suits,
and Part III identifies the relevant environmental justice concerns raised
by Flint and similarly contaminated cities.
Part IV examines hypothetical policy solutions to each discussed
issue to combat their likely consequences. Ultimately, overly individual-
ized solutions risk exacerbating other issues.
To optimally address each dimension of Flint’s water problem
invoked in Parts I, II, and III, Part V analyzes and argues for, a proposed
solution to create a Water Contamination Liability Fund, which would
cover the costs of correcting the water contamination and compensating
injured citizens. The Fund would be financed by a nominal tax on water
usage in municipal systems. It is likely that this program could circum-
vent barriers to recovery such as sovereign immunity—discussed in Part
I—by implementing administrative hearings and avoiding formal law-
suits altogether.
.reuters.com/article/us-michigan-water-idUSKCN12I2J8]; David Bailey, Flint Water
Class Action Belongs in State Court—6th Circuit, REUTERS LEGAL (Nov. 18, 2016); Jeremy
Dillon, Oversight Panel Democrats Want Flint Investigation Reopened, ROLL CALL (Jan. 19,
2017, 4:30 PM), http://www.rollcall.com/news/policy/over sight-panel-democrats-want-flint
-investigation-reopened [https://perma.cc/ZC2J-PJDY]; Ben Klayman, Michigan Attorney
General Sues France’s Veolia in Flint Water Crisis, REUTERS (June 22, 2016, 10:28 AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-michigan-water-idUSKCN0Z81PD [https://web.archive
.org/web/*/http://www.reuters.com/article/us-michigan-water-idUSKCN0Z81PD].
8 Erik Olson & Kristi Pullen Fedinick, What’s in Your Water? Flint and Beyond, NRDC
(June 28, 2016), https://www.nrdc.org/resources/whats-your-water-flint-and-beyond [https://
perma.cc/2L92-SQPY]. For example, “[a]ccording to the most recent data available, 5,363
active community water systems across the United States” faced issues relating to the
Lead and Copper Rule in 2015. Id.
9 Id.
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Furthermore, this policy would spread the cost of water contami-
nation suits across the entire state, thereby reducing the budgetary
burden on a locality in crisis, and thus the proportion of damages funded
by a plaintiff community’s own residents by way of taxation. Finally, by
implementing this program at the state or federal level, it could improve
environmental justice by spreading the cost of water contamination more
broadly across many neighborhoods of different classes, reducing the cost
to already burdened communities with scant resources.
BACKGROUND: THE SITUATION IN FLINT
To save money during the construction of a new pipeline from Lake
Huron, Flint switched from Detroit’s water system to the Flint River.10
Emergency manager Darnell Earley, appointed by Gov. Rick Snyder to
continue addressing Flint’s budgetary emergency in October 2013,11 made
the formal decision to switch.12 The Flint River was contaminated with
mercury, PCBs,13 and other corrosives from years of industrial runoff
that leech lead from the water pipes into Flint’s water.14 Residents noted
distinct problems with their water including color and smell,15 and soon
after, Flint switched back to the Detroit water supply.16 However, by that
point, the protective coating on the municipal water pipes had been worn
away, and lead was continuing to leech into the water.17
Many experienced law firms were wary to take on these cases due
to the limitations of sovereign immunity,18 a legal privilege held by the
10 Tribune News Services, Class action suit filed by residents over Flint water crisis,
CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Mar 7, 2016, 2:28 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local
/breaking/ct-flint-water-crisis-class-action-lawsuit-20160307-story.html [https://perma.cc
/J432-E2HM].
11 Detroit News Staff, How Flint’s water contamination crisis developed, THE DETROIT
NEWS (Feb. 2, 2016, 11:32 PM), http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/michigan/flint
-water-crisis/2016/02/02/flints-water-contamination-crisis-developed/79736038 [https://
perma.cc/JU7B-MTQE].
12 Rita Ann Cicero, In Flint, Lawsuits Over Drinking Water Contamination Start Trick-
ling In, 33 WESTLAW J. TOXIC TORTS 4 (2016).
13 Id.
14 Tribune News Services, supra note 10.
15 Cicero, supra note 12.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Amber Phillips, Criminal charges were just filed in Flint. But suing over the water crisis
remains very difficult., WASH. POST (Apr. 20, 2016), https://www.washington post.com
/news/the-fix/wp/2016/01/26/why-it-will-be-very-difficult-for-flint-residents-to-sue-the
-state-of-michigan-for-money/ [https://perma.cc/9T2J-4DMH].
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federal and state governments that insulates each from many lawsuits.19
However, this has not stopped a few Michigan lawyers from pursuing
creative legal theories to circumnavigate sovereign immunity, such as
construing the harm as a constitutional violation.20 For example, one of
the first class lawsuits filed on November 13, 2015 was Melissa Mays, et
al., v. Governor Rick Snyder et al. in which the plaintiffs claimed the actions
of the Flint and State governments deprived residents of their rights with-
out due process.21 This lawsuit sought compensatory damages, punitive
damages, as well as medical, educational, occupational, and nutritional
support for Flint citizens.22 However, it was dismissed on the grounds
that claims regarding unsafe drinking water must proceed under the
procedures in the Safe Drinking Water Act (“SDWA”).23 Unfortunately,
if the plaintiffs in Mays did file a claim under the SDWA, they would
only be able to receive injunctive relief and legal fees.24 Under the SDWA
there is no path to obtain the compensatory and punitive damages they
originally sought.25
Other suits have arisen in federal court under the SDWA.26 The
claim filed by Concerned Pastors for Social Action under the SDWA sought
equitable relief for Flint.27 Specifically, the lawsuit sought replacement
of all lead water pipes at no cost to the Flint taxpayer.28 Ultimately, the
parties settled in March, 2017.29 The state of Michigan agreed to pay $87
million to replace Flint’s lead contaminated pipes with copper lines.30 The
plaintiffs also secured bottled water distribution in the interim, including
a hotline for those who could not physically reach destination sites.31
Medical costs and other damages caused by the contaminated water were
19 See Sovereign Immunity, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
20 Mays v. Snyder, No. 15-14002, 2017 WL 445637, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 2, 2017).
21 Id.
22 Jennifer Chambers, Flint water lawsuit dismissed by judge, THE DETROIT NEWS (Feb. 3,
2017, 3:44 PM), http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/michigan/flint-water-crisis/2017/02
/03/judge-dismisses-class-action-flint-water-lawsuit/97436892/ [https://perma.cc/G6SF-RHT3].
23 Mays, 2017 WL 445637, at *3.
24 42 U.S.C.A. § 300j-8(d).
25 See id. § 300j-8(e).
26 Concerned Pastors for Soc. Action v. Khouri, 194 F. Supp. 3d 589, 596 (E.D. Mich. 2016).
27 Id. at 596–97.
28 Id. at 595–96.
29 See Settlement Agreement, Concerned Pastors for Soc. Action v. Khouri, 194 F. Supp.
3d 589, 596 (E.D. Mich. 2016), http://www.michigan.gov/documents/flintwater/Settlement
_Agreement_dated_032717_580103_7.pdf [https://perma.cc/VD52-XAGV] [hereinafter
Settlement Agreement].
30 Id. at 20.
31 Id. at 54, 57.
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left notably unaddressed32 because SDWA does not allow for their recov-
ery.33 The compensatory damages for the Crisis are not negligible. For
example, United Way anticipates the medical costs for exposed children
alone will reach $100 million.34 At present, the restrictions of the SDWA,
and government torts generally, have created a legal environment in
which these costs remain unaddressed.
If the citizens of Flint are limited to claims under the SDWA, they
will be unable to obtain compensatory relief for any of the health effects
of their lead-ridden water.35 This Note strives to bridge this remedy gap
and address other elements of the problem in Flint to ease similar prob-
lems in the future. To fully analyze the scale of the problem, this Paper
explores the Flint water crisis in greater depth within the areas of 1) sov-
ereign immunity as a barrier to recovery, 2) the negative externalities of
citizen-class lawsuits, and 3) lack of environmental justice.
I. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AS A BARRIER TO RECOVERY
It should come as no surprise that numerous lawsuits have arisen
seeking damages from the government agencies responsible for Flint’s
contaminated water system.36 However, those who have been harmed face
barriers to their recovery.37 One such substantial barrier is the doctrine
of sovereign immunity, which bars civil claims against the government.38
The concept of sovereign immunity in the United States is origi-
nally sourced from England.39 It is based on the premise that “[t]he King
could do no wrong.”40 Under the modern doctrine of sovereign immunity
in the United States, the federal government cannot be sued unless it
consents to be sued.41 The United States maintains sovereign immunity
“to shield the public from the costs and consequences of improvident
32 See id. at 59–62.
33 42 U.S.C.A. § 300j-8(d–e).




35 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300j-8(d–e).
36 See Cicero, supra note 12.
37 Phillips, supra note 18.
38 Id.
39 See, e.g., William Blackstone, Commentaries on the law of England, 238 (1765).
40 Id.
41 See United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941).
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actions of their governments,”42 such as lawsuits.43 In United States v.
Shaw, Justice Reed wrote, “[t]he reasons for this immunity are imbedded
in our legal philosophy. They partake somewhat of dignity and decorum,
somewhat of practical administration, somewhat of the political desir-
ability of an impregnable legal citadel where government as distinct from
its functionaries may operate undisturbed by the demands of litigants.”44
The 11th Amendment protects states from lawsuits filed by citizens
of another state.45 All states, besides Washington,46 expressly limit gov-
ernment tort liability from their own citizens as well.47 In the context of
the Flint Water Crisis, Michigan is not liable for acts it performs in its
governmental capacity unless it expressly waives immunity.48 Michigan’s
immunity extends to its political subdivision and municipalities.49 This
is often called “governmental immunity” when applied to these political
subdivisions of the state of Michigan,50 although there is little distinction
between the two, conceptually.
Notably, sovereign immunity has an exception built into its frame-
work; the government can consent to be sued.51 This can be accomplished
quite easily by statute.52 For example, Congress passed the Federal Tort
Claims Act (“FTCA”) in 1946,53 which generally grants jurisdiction to the
District Court to hear tort claims against the United States.54 While the
FTCA is codified in statute, the United States consents to suit for claims
seeking money damages for any “negligent or wrongful act or omission
of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his
office or employment.”55 This liability extends to any act considered a tort
according to the law of the place it occurred.56 However, there are many
42 Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325, 332 (Tex. 2006).
43 See United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495, 501 (1940).
44 Id.
45 U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
46 Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 4.92.090 (West).
47 Lawrence Rosenthal, A Theory of Governmental Damages Liability: Torts, Consti-
tutional Torts, and Takings, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 797, 804 (2007).
48 Shuey v. State of Mich., 106 F. Supp. 32 (E.D. Mich. 1952).
49 Id. at 34.
50 See Hannay v. Dep’t of Transp., 497 Mich. 45, 58–59, 860 N.W.2d 67, 76 (Mich. 2014).
51 United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941).
52 E.g., 28 U.S.C.A. § 2674.
53 Frank Hanley Santoro, A Practical Guide to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 63 CONN. B.J.
224 (1989).
54 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(a), (b)(1) (West).
55 Id. § 1346(b)(1).
56 Id. § 1346.
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notable exceptions that make the FTCA a much less substantial waiver
of sovereign immunity than it appears.57 The “intentional tort exception”58
maintains sovereign immunity for assault or battery, false imprisonment
or false arrest, malicious prosecution or abuse of process, libel or slander,
misrepresentation or deceit, and interference with contract rights.59 The
act also does not curtail sovereign immunity for “discretionary func-
tions”60 which, in turn, provides rather broad protection for government
actors carrying out policy.61 The Supreme Court developed a two-part test
to determine what qualifies as a discretionary function in Berkovitz by
Berkovitz v. United States.62 Generally, if 1) the government employee’s
conduct involves a judgment or choice and 2) that choice was made in the
fulfillment of public policy, then the discretionary exception applies.63
Finally, the FTCA also contains exceptions relating to the postal service,
tax collection, quarantines, operations of the Treasury, and the activities
of the military during war.64
In regard to Flint, the State of Michigan codified some modest
curtailments of sovereign immunity. These curtailments included actions
within the context of providing medical care,65 as well as liability under
the MISS DIG Underground Facility Damage Prevention and Safety
Act66 involving the maintenance and protection of underground facili-
ties.67 However, Michigan maintains a provision that generally insulates
agents of the government 1) acting within the scope of their authority, 2)
in the discharge of a government function, and 3) that did commit an
action (though not amounting to gross negligence) that is the proximate
cause of alleged injury or damage.68 Most relevant to the Flint Water
Crisis, emergency managers are generally immune from tort liability.69
57 David W. Fuller, Intentional Torts and Other Exceptions to the Federal Tort Claims Act,
8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 375, 376 (2011) (naming the exceptions as the central issue in
lawsuits brought under the FTCA); see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2680.
58 Id. at 379.
59 Id. citing 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2006).
60 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680 (West 2006).
61 See Statutory Exceptions to Sovereign Immunity—Actions Under The Federal Tort
Claims Act—The Discretionary Function Exception, 14 Fed. Prac. & Proc Juris. § 3658.1
(4th ed. 2017).
62 Berkovitz by Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536–37 (1988).
63 See id.
64 Fuller, supra note 57, at 380.
65 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 691.1407(4) (West 2014).
66 Id. § 691.1407(7).
67 See Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 460.271 (West 2017).
68 See Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 691.1407(2) (West 2014).
69 Id. § 691.1407(1).
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As such, there are few viable pathways for citizens harmed by the Crisis
to recover damages in tort for the actions of the emergency manager,70
who ultimately made the decision to switch water supplies.71
Unless it is waived in statute, or creative Mays-like72 lawsuits set
precedent helpful to citizen-plaintiffs, sovereign immunity will continue
to serve as a barrier to recovery.
II. THE EXTERNALITIES OF AWARDED DAMAGES
Even if it was possible to overcome the hurdle of sovereign immu-
nity, seeking damages from a government is unhelpful to a large class of
citizens; the funding a government would use to pay damages or fulfill
injunctive relief is ultimately derived from that community’s own taxes.
In other words, citizens bear the cost of their own awards after trial. This
ironic phenomenon runs counter to predominate theories and justifica-
tions in support of tort liability.
There are two competing theories of tort liability: instrumentalist
and noninstrumentalist, or “corrective justice.”73 Instrumentalism is more
utilitarian in nature.74 It states that one should either fulfill one’s duties
of precaution, short of wasteful activity, or pay the cost of failing to do
so.75 Conversely, corrective justice is more deontological.76 It states that
one has a duty to correct one’s mistakes, irrelevant of consequence, and
restore victims to the time before the harm.77
Instrumentalism is perhaps best expressed in United States v.
Carol Towing Co. Judge Billings Learned Hand described duty in tort
claims as a “function of three variables: (1) The probability [of injury,]
(2) the gravity of the resulting injury . . . [, and] (3) the burden of ade-
quate precautions.”78 The instrumentalist theory, which assumes the risk
of payout, encourages caution; an individual or profit-motivated company
should be motivated to apply Hand’s formula to avoid costly lawsuits.79
70 See Phillips, supra note 18.
71 Kennedy, supra note 1.
72 See Mays, 2017 WL 445637, at *1.
73 Richard A. Posner, Instrumental and Noninstrumental Theories of Tort Law, 88 IND.





78 United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
79 See generally Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the
Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345 (2000).
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But governments are not similarly motivated; the monies in the govern-
ment’s possession are public funds, and as such, “government cares not
about dollars, only about votes.”80 Thus, unless the payout from the
lawsuit becomes large and salient enough to galvanize voters, it is ques-
tionable whether a costly lawsuit actually motivates a government to
behave cautiously.
If a court orders damages for a tort claim in which the govern-
ment is the defendant, corrective justice is not achieved either. This is
because these costs are not solely shifted to, or borne by, culpable parties.81
Additionally, localities heavily compete to provide residents with services
at reasonable costs.82 If a lawsuit puts greater pressure on the budget of
a community, it may motivate residents and businesses to leave the
locality as service costs go up or tax revenues go down, further undermin-
ing the local tax base and economy.83 With these consequences in mind,
the goals of corrective justice are not met because the harmed are not ac-
tually made whole. If the government faces substantial damages, it is the
citizens who pay via taxes, lost services, or possibly a damaged economy.84
Therefore, neither major theory of tort of liability justifies govern-
ment liability because the government lacks its own resources apart from
public funds. This is particularly relevant for small localities like Flint,
where all citizens were potentially harmed by their government. This
evokes a situation in which citizens, as plaintiffs, would effectively fund
their own legal damages. This concern was highlighted by the plaintiffs
in Concerned Pastors for Social Action et al., who specifically requested
injunctive relief to replace corroded pipes at no cost to the system’s
customers.85 The settlement agreement secures funding for injunctive
relief from the State of Michigan, rather than the local government.86
This, at least, reduces the proportional local tax burden to the citizens of
Flint by pulling the funding from across the entire State.
Instrumentalism does not justify holding a government liable in
class water contamination suits because the government can only lose
funds derived from the public at large. Thus, there is little loss aversion
80 Id. at 420.
81 Rosenthal, supra note 47, at 820.
82 See Vicki Been, “Exit” As A Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Un-
constitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 511–14 (1991).
83 Rosenthal, supra note 47, at 848.
84 See Been, supra note 82, at 511–14.
85 Concerned Pastors for Soc. Action, 194 F. Supp. 3d at 596.
86 Settlement Agreement, supra note 29, at 596.
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motivating caution. Neither does corrective justice justify government
liability in class water contamination suits, because the plaintiff citizens
are not truly compensated for their harm when they receive damages they
funded with their own taxes. This issue would grow in severity as more
plaintiffs join a suit. Hypothetically, a single plaintiff harmed by the gov-
ernment is proportionally paying very little of his or her damage award,
but a class of every citizen in a tortfeasant locality must fund every cent
of damages awarded. Any policy designed to remedy the problems of
Flint should carefully consider funding sources to avoid a situation where
plaintiffs pay for their own damages after a lawsuit.
III. ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
Flint is a clear example of the need for greater environmental jus-
tice in the United States. The EPA defines environmental justice as the
“fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of
race, color, national origin, or income, with respect to the development,
implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and
policies.”87 Here in the United States, poor and minority communities are
disproportionately impacted by environmental harms and degradation.88
The lead issues in Flint are emblematic of the need for greater
environmental justice nationally.89 For example, the Center for Disease
Control notes that poor and minority Americans have a higher risk for
lead exposure.90 Flint boasts a population that is fifty-seven percent
African American.91 Forty-two percent of Flint’s citizens live below the
poverty line.92 The Michigan Civil Rights Commission (“Commission”),
under the Michigan Department of Civil Rights, blames the systematic
racism of the housing market, even following the passage of the Fair Hous-
ing Act of 1968, for these racially and economically slanted demographic
87 EPA, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, https://www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice [https://
perma.cc/LV8K-UKHM] (last visited Oct. 23, 2017).
88 See Rachel D. Godsil, Remedying Environmental Racism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 394, 397 (1991);
Mariaea Ramirez Fisher, On the Road from Environmental Racism to Environmental
Justice, 5 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 449, 452 (1994); Gerald Torres, Introduction: Understanding
Environmental Racism, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 839, 842 (1992).
89 E.g., David A. Dana & Deborah Tuerkheimer, After Flint: Environmental Justice As
Equal Protection, 111 NW. U.L. REV. ONLINE 93 (2017).
90 CDC, AT RISK POPULATIONS, https://www.cdc.gov/nceh/lead/tips/populations.htm [https://
perma.cc/H2MW-QLYY] (last visited Oct. 23, 2017).
91 Dana & Tuerkheimer, supra note 89, at 93.
92 Id.
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statistics.93 When racial minorities began purchasing homes in the area,
it drove down the values of properties, which caused a “flight” from the
community.94 Financially stable and predominantly white families va-
cated Flint after the Fair Housing Act was passed.95 The Commission
looked beyond “economic flight” to blame racism directly, and on a sys-
temic scale, for the current landscape of Flint.96 If white citizens who left
the city were only concerned about their property values or economics
generally, many would not have thrown away money by leaving their
homes unsold.97 As the Commission explains, “[t]he result is a poor, less
educated and disproportionately black population left behind with a
shrinking tax base and a greater share of the city’s costs.”98 Their report
concludes confidently that racial and economic forces created an environ-
ment in which a crisis was “all but inevitable” in Flint.99
The Commission strove to avoid blaming any party or actor for
the situation in Flint.100 However, factually, it is well established that
Gov. Rick Snyder appointed emergency manager Michael Brown in 2011
to control finances in the wake of Flint’s financial crisis.101 Further, it
was subsequent emergency manager Darnell Earley who ultimately
made the decision to switch the city’s water supply to the Flint River, in
order to save money.102
As demonstrated by Flint, the importance of accountability in
government action can directly conflict with the doctrine of sovereign
immunity, especially in the face of poverty and lack of resources. A lack
of environmental justice played, and will continue to play, a role in the
93 See Michigan Civil Rights Commission, The Flint Water Crisis: Systemic Racism
Through the Lens of Flint, 38 (Feb. 17, 2017), https://www.michigan.gov/documents/mdcr
/VFlintCrisisRep-F-Edited3-13-17_554317_7.pdf [https://perma.cc/85NC-W9ZN].
94 Id. at 69.
95 Id. at 68–69.
96 Id. at 69.
97 Id.
98 Michigan Civil Rights Commission, supra note 93, at 68–69.
99 Id. at 114.
100 Id. at 9.
101 Detroit News Staff, supra note 11.
102 Leonard N. Fleming, Darnell Earley: The man in power during Flint switch, THE
DETROIT NEWS (Mar. 14, 2016 7:31 PM), http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/michi
gan/flint-water-crisis/2016/03/14/darnell-earley-flint-water-crisis/81788654/ [https://perma
.cc/X5F9-U3DG]; See also Letter from Darnell Earley, Emergency Manager, City of Flint,
to Sue McCormick, Detroit Water and Sewer Department (Mar. 7, 2014), http://mediad
.publicbroadcasting.net/p/michigan/files/201512/earlely_letter.pdf?_ga=1.224901786
.1036207224.1446746452 [https://perma.cc/JVU2-KP8R].
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development of this crisis.103 Any policy solution that seeks to meaning-
fully compensate victims, such as those in Flint, must account for these
institutional pressures.
IV. A PROPOSAL AND EXAMINATION OF POSSIBLE POLICY SOLUTIONS
Each of the three aforementioned dimensions of the Flint water
crisis can be addressed individually through policy. The following three
sections propose and analyze individualized solutions to each of them.
A. Reducing Sovereign Immunity at State Level for Water
Contamination
Sovereign immunity serves as a bar to recovery for Flint’s harmed
citizens.104 As a possible policy solution, states could expressly consent
to suit and compensatory damages for water contamination liability,
when the negligent actions of governments or water authorities cause
harm. To avoid the pitfall of overburdening an already harmed commu-
nity, sovereign immunity could be pulled back at the state level, rather
than the locality, to better distribute the cost of awarded damages over
a wider area and reduce the proportional burden on the harmed plaintiffs
in their community. Although relaxed sovereign immunity standards at
the federal level would provide access to an even broader area to distribute
damages, the federal government is far removed, and often constitution-
ally distinct, from the negligent actions of a locality. Thus, the state serves
as the best place to implement this policy to distribute cost without re-
moving a legal nexus of liability. Under this policy, when citizens of Flint
are harmed by water contamination, all of Michigan pays for it.
However, this policy is unfavorable because 1) there is no consis-
tent rule for determining a state’s vicarious liability for the actions of a
locality and 2) curtailing sovereign immunity comes with substantial
costs and barriers.
1. Legal Ambiguity of State Liability
For this policy to function and not burden the community itself with
the entirety of liability and damages, a state must bear some responsibility
for the negligence of localities within its borders. However, there is no
103 Michigan Civil Rights Commission, supra note 93, at 114.
104 Supra Part I.
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concrete rule for determining when a state is liable for the actions of a
locality.105 It is not entirely novel to hold a state liable in this manner; for
example, the Fourth and Ninth Circuits have held states are liable for
failures of their respective localities to implement the Food Stamp Act of
1964.106 However, in Milliken v. Bradley, the Supreme Court did not con-
sider the State of Michigan vicariously liable for the de jure segregation
of Detroit schools.107 As such, it is entirely possible that even if sovereign
immunity is relaxed at the state level, liability will rest entirely with the
locality government and burden citizens with their own damages.
Another key factor in a discussion of state liability for locality
action is whether that state follows what is known as “Dillon’s Rule.”
Dillon’s Rule, named after the late Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals Judge
and former Iowa Supreme Court Chief Justice John F. Dillon,108 outlines
that “[a] municipal corporation can only exercise those powers: (1) granted
to it by express words; (2) necessary or fairly implied in the express pow-
ers; and (3) that are indispensable to its ability to carry out its pur-
poses.”109 Dillon’s Rule may establish a greater liability link between the
actions of localities and the state government, but there is no coherent
standard to solidify this possibility.110
In contrast, “Home Rule” asserts that localities themselves have “an
inherent right to self-determination.”111 Relevantly, this second stance has
been labeled “The Cooley Doctrine” after Michigan Supreme Court Chief
Justice Thomas M. Cooley and his concurring opinion in the 1871 case
People v. Hurlbut, in which he stated that “local government is [a] matter
of absolute right; and the state cannot take it away. It would be the boldest
mockery to speak of a city as possessing municipal liberty where the
state . . . at discretion sent in its own agents to administer it . . . .”112 This
historic language is representative of Michigan’s long-standing struggle to
105 The State’s Vicarious Liability for the Actions of the City, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1036–37
(2011) [hereinafter State’s Vicarious Liability].
106 Id. at 1039–40.
107 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 749–50 (1974).
108 JOHN F. DILLON, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS I (1872).
109 22A Summ. Pa. Jur. 2d Municipal and Local Law § 13:4 (2d ed. 2017). Dillon’s Rule
is derived from Judge Dillon’s Treatise on the Law of Municipal Corporations and his
jurisprudence. Id.
110 State’s Vicarious Liability, supra note 105, at 1039 (stating that there is no coherent
rule for determining the liability link between states and localities).
111 CITIZENS RESEARCH COUNCIL OF MICHIGAN, MICHIGAN CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 3,
Report No. 313-09 (Oct. 1994), http://www.crcmich.org/PUBLICAT/1990s/1994/rpt31309
.pdf [https://perma.cc/NKF5-37T9].
112 People ex rel. Le Roy v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44, 108 (Mich. 1871) (Cooley, J., concurring).
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assign responsibility between local and state actors, as well as its tradi-
tional strength as a Home Rule state, thus further complicating the
situation. The debate between Dillon’s Rule and Home Rule policies, and
their modern implications, resurfaced in 2011 when Governor Rick Snyder
sought to impose a program of state-assigned emergency managers on
financially struggling cities in Michigan.113 The effect of Dillon’s Rule,
and the ambiguous state of the law in this area, means the policy may
not ultimately function as intended.
It is therefore very possible courts will not be able to hold states
liable for negligence on the local level. If this is the case, curtailing
sovereign immunity for water contamination liability at the state level
would achieve nothing for the citizens seeking compensatory damages.
2. Barriers and Costs of Curtailing Sovereign Immunity
Consenting to suit for water contamination at the state level may
prove unwise or ineffective. First, sovereign immunity at the federal level
can be enforced constitutionally through the Appropriations Clause.114
Article I decrees that “[n]o Money shall be drawn from the Treasury but
in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.”115 This gives Congress
substantial discretion to determine if and when it pays damages to harmed
plaintiffs.116 For example, in District of Columbia. v. Eslin, Plaintiffs were
awarded damages after they filed suit under a law created by Con-
gress.117 The District of Columbia appealed the ruling.118 However, before
the appellate hearing, Congress passed another law, which directed the
Secretary of the Treasury not to pay the damages.119 The Appellate Court
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction stating it was the “one solu-
tion” after Congress passed the new law.120 This indicates that even if the
federal government consents to suits, Congress may nullify any damages
through legislation, even after a court has awarded them.121
113 Jamess, Michigan Has a History of ‘Home Rule’—Despite the Unconstitutional Take-
overs Using Dillon’s Rule, DAILY KOS (Apr. 30, 2011, 3:00 PM), https://www.dailykos
.com/stories/2011/4/30/971713/- [https://perma.cc/3LF5-4D83].
114 See Rosenthal, supra note 47, at 802–03.
115 U.S. CONST. art. I § 9, cl. 7.
116 Rosenthal, supra note 47, at 802–03.
117 District of Columbia v. Eslin, 183 U.S. 62, 62–64 (1901).
118 Id. at 64.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 64–65.
121 See generally id. at 64.
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Michigan’s constitution also contains an Appropriations Clause,122
suggesting the state could potentially perform the same maneuver.123
Ultimately, appropriations clauses in state and federal constitutions
mean that any curtailment of sovereign immunity by statute would pro-
vide neither a permanent nor a dependable solution.
Furthermore, relaxing sovereign immunity comes with certain
consequences and pitfalls.124 First, immunity may disincentivize govern-
ment action for fear of incurring a lawsuit.125 For example, if a lawsuit
can arise for any action taken, a legislature may pursue only the most
cautious of steps rather than the most effective ones.126 Secondly, some
fear that lawsuits provide a pathway for courts to weigh in on policy
actions of the other two branches; in determining reasonableness and
negligence courts would have greater say in the allocation of resources
and the direction of policy, which were previously immunized.127 Third,
sovereign immunity protects majoritarian government by insulating the
democratically elected government from litigious minority factions.128
In the context of the Flint water crisis, these issues could also
worsen the problems of environmental justice, by deterring government
action;129 the communities most at risk to experience problems requiring
rapid government intervention130 would be left helpless. Even if sover-
eign immunity was pulled back solely in the area of water contamination,
one could imagine a toxic spill that required rapid cleanup might be ap-
proached slowly and cautiously by a lawsuit-adverse executive branch.131
Ultimately, addressing the problem of sovereign immunity by
itself comes with substantial hurdles as well as externalities which
undermine the other dimensions of the Flint problem.
122 Mich. Const. 1963, art. 9, § 17.
123 Michigan lacks definitive precedent to determine if this is possible. However, District
of Columbia v. Eslin indicates Michigan holds powers to pass laws effectively revoking
tort damages when the State is a defendant to a tort claim. District of Columbia, 183 U.S.
at 64–65.
124 Harold J. Krent, Reconceptualizing Sovereign Immunity, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1529,
1530–31 (1992).
125 Id. at 1537.
126 Id. at 1541.
127 Id. at 1536–67.
128 See id. at 1530.
129 See Krent, supra note 124, at 1537.
130 See generally Michigan Civil Rights Commission, supra note 93, at 12.
131 See generally Krent, supra note 124, at 1537.
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B. Don’t Make Plaintiffs Pay for Their Own Damages: Freezing
Plaintiff Taxes as a Remedy in Water Contamination Lawsuits
To directly prevent a situation in which a class of Plaintiffs
effectively provides for a substantial portion of their own damages when
filing suit against a government for water contamination,132 a policy
could be designed that directly prevents a locality from increasing taxes
on plaintiffs in a water contamination suit for a set period of time. This
could be implemented by establishing, in statute, a “tax freeze” as an
available remedy in water contamination suits in which localities are
liable for the harm. Theoretically, this policy would force the locality to
pay damages through means other than taxing the plaintiffs, and take
the situation a step closer to the ideals of corrective justice.
Unfortunately, under this hypothetical policy, the locality would
be left with less palatable options for raising the funds to pay damages
when they cannot raise taxes on plaintiffs. One can imagine the locality
would either have to put the entire tax burden of the lawsuit on the only
citizens who escaped the harm in the first place (i.e., persons who did not
join in the suit), reduce services for the whole community, or appeal to
outside funding. It is unrealistic to expect the few citizens that did not
join the lawsuit to pay the tax burden and reducing services would still
harm the class plaintiffs as well. Ultimately, this is also an undesirable
option because, even by shielding the plaintiffs from a tax increase, they
will likely still experience economic harm though as the cost is placed on
their community.
C. Policies to Address Environmental Injustice
Environmental justice is generally described as a systematic prob-
lem;133 therefore, it can be addressed by a variety of initiatives and policies.
This variety is beneficial because it provides more potential pathways
forward, which would hopefully avoid exacerbating other dimensions of
the Flint water crisis.
There are a variety of existing recommendations to improve envi-
ronmental justice including 1) recognizing, when conducting cost-benefit
analysis, that benefits do not defuse easily throughout an impoverished
132 Supra Part II.
133 E.g., Michigan Civil Rights Commission, supra note 93, at 10.
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area,134 2) encouraging the government and large well-funded environ-
mental organizations to engage with grass roots organizations in disad-
vantaged communities,135 3) establishing a claim for disparate impact on
the federal level in regards to hazardous waste facility siting,136 and
4) upgrading energy facilities, promoting green energy, and funding dis-
tributed generation in disadvantaged communities to reduce emissions
in these areas.137
The Commission in Michigan provides a litany of policy recom-
mendations for improving environmental justice and preventing the next
Flint-like crisis; they include recommendations to 1) develop mechanisms
to identify when the civil rights of a community are being ignored,
2) relocate agency meetings to the threatened communities they involve,
3) aggregate and transmit community concerns to other relevant govern-
ment agencies, even when the aggregating agency is not adopting those
concerns as an official policy stance, 4) invite psychologists to govern-
ment agencies to provide training on avoiding implicit bias, and 5) train
all levels of government on the role of structural racism in the develop-
ment of disparate outcomes.138 Most relevant to the Flint water crisis
itself, the Commission also recommended revising the emergency man-
ager laws to 1) direct manager focus to the root of fiscal problems, rather
than the financial symptoms, 2) empower elected local representatives
to perform emergency manager functions, and 3) make emergency man-
agers accountable to the elected officials, among other provisions.139
Depending on how this relationship between the State government, the
local government, and the emergency manager is altered, it could poten-
tially clarify the liability link between the actions of a locality and the
actions of state.
Many of these solutions do not directly involve the barriers to
recovery discussed in this Note. Therefore, Michigan and other states can
implement them with little effect on the issues of sovereign immunity
and the externalities of locality-paid damages.
134 See generally Shannon M. Roesler, Addressing Environmental Injustices: A Capability
Approach to Rulemaking, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 49, 50, 53 (2011).
135 See generally Fisher, supra 88, at 451–52.
136 Godsil, supra note 88, at 421–22.
137 James M. Van Nostrand, Energy and Environmental Justice: How States Can Inte-
grate Environmental Justice into Energy-Related Proceedings, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 701,
722 (2012).
138 Michigan Civil Rights Commission, supra note 93, at 117–19.
139 Id. at 122–24.
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V. THREE BIRDS WITH ONE STONE: ESTABLISHING THE WATER
CONTAMINATION LIABILITY FUND—FOLLOWING THE EXAMPLE
OF THE UNDERGROUND STORAGE TANK INSURANCE PROGRAMS
In 1988 the EPA established regulations under 40 C.F.R. § 280(H),
which defined the financial responsibilities of the owners of underground
storage tanks for petroleum and other hazardous substances.140 The EPA’s
goal was to ensure there were funds available to finance the clean-up of
any spill, and compensate anyone harmed by a spill.141 As part of this
program, EPA gave tank owners a variety of options to comply with this
regulation, such as participating in a state-administered assurance pro-
gram that offers coverage from $500,000 to $1 million depending on the
size of the tank.142
Many states, including Michigan,143 created public funds to meet
the needs of storage tank owners.144 In Michigan the program was funded
by charging owners a $100 registration fee and a one cent per gallon tax
on motor fuel.145 The concept for these state-based funds mirrors a simi-
lar program at the federal level for federally regulated storage tanks
implemented in 1986 called the Leaking Underground Storage Tank
(“LUST”) Trust Fund.146 The LUST Trust Fund money was used to “over-
see cleanups of petroleum released by responsible parties; [e]nforce
cleanups by recalcitrant parties; [p]ay for cleanups at sites where the
owner or operator is unknown, unwilling, or unable to respond, or which
140 40 C.F.R. § 280.93. See also 1988 Underground Storage Tanks; Technical Require-
ments; Final Rule and Underground Storage Tanks Containing Petroleum—Financial
Responsibility Requirements and State Program Approval Objective; Final Rule, EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/ust/1988-underground-storage-tanks-technical-requirements-final
-rule-and-underground-storage-tanks (last visited Oct. 23, 2017) [https://perma.cc/8CX2
-9FSH] [hereinafter 1988 Underground].
141 EPA Study On The Effectiveness Of UST Insurance As A Financial Responsibility (FR)
Mechanism at 1 (Dec. 2011), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-03/docu
ments/epa-insurance-paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/7MJ2-4A9Y] (last visited Oct. 23, 2017).
142 See 40 C.F.R. § 280.93; 40 C.F.R. § 280.101.
143 Michigan Underground Storage Tank Authority, DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, http://
www.michigan.gov/deq/0,4561,7-135-3311_4109_9977_73545---,00.html [https://perma
.cc/5TQ4-82CW] (last visited Oct. 23, 2017).
144 Haitao Yin et al., Risk-Based Pricing and Risk-Reducing Effort: Does the Private
Insurance Market Reduce Environmental Accidents?, 54 J.L. & ECON. 325, 331 (2011).
145 Id.
146 Leaking Underground Storage Tank (LUST) Trust Fund, EPA, https://www.epa.gov
/ust/leaking-underground-storage-tank-lust-trust-fund [https://perma.cc/YX8U-FX9N]
(last visited Oct. 23, 2017).
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require emergency action; and [c]onduct inspections and other release
prevention activities.”147 It was funded by a one cent per gallon tax on
motor fuel.148 The program is well used, funding over 9,000 cleanups in
the 2015 fiscal year.149
This framework could be applied to the situation in Flint by
creating a “Water Contamination Liability Fund” (“Fund”) at the state
level to finance the cleanup and liability of water contamination caused
by government action. The Fund would spread the risk of water contami-
nation across a larger group, so those harmed by toxic drinking water are
better proportionally and economically compensated for harms.
In conjunction with the tax, the state should route any claims
through an administrative hearing to avoid the burden of formal litiga-
tion on the locality and state. Administrative hearings cost less to both
sides, require fewer government resources, and utilize adjudicators who
specialize in the field and maintain familiarity with the relevant is-
sues.150 When citizens are harmed by lead poisoning, for example, these
administrative adjudicates can award them compensation. The Fund
could be sourced from a nominal tax on water usage, similar to the LUST
tax on gasoline.
A. The Water Contamination Liability Fund Can Address the
Varied Dimensions of the Flint Water Crisis
As discussed in Parts I through III, the water crisis in Flint con-
tains multiple dimensions including 1) sovereign immunity as barrier to
recovery, 2) the externalities of winning damages in a suit against a
citizen’s own government, and 3) the violation of environmental justice.
The Water Contamination Fund Policy can be designed to effectively
address all three.151
The Fund could circumnavigate sovereign immunity by providing
procedures for an administrative hearing to assess a claimant’s damages
from water contamination, instead of having plaintiffs rely on the tort
147 1988 Underground, supra note 140.
148 Id.
149 Leaking Underground Storage Tank Trust Fund Corrective Action Program, CATALOG
OF FEDERAL DOMESTIC ASSISTANCE, https://www.cfda.gov/index?s=program&mode=form
&tab=step1&id=2a8cd17a0ba4277511f7ed10c04f08a6 [https://perma.cc/RAM5-G5NS]
(last visited Oct. 23, 2017).
150 Christopher B. McNeil, The Marginal Utility of Consolidated Agency Hearings in Ohio:
A Due Process Analysis from an Economic Perspective, 32 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 127, 131 (2006).
151 See supra Parts I–III.
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liability system. By using an administrative hearing, this policy would
avoid the dangers of relaxing sovereign immunity, such as the burden of
litigation on local governments.152
The Fund could also reduce the ironic cost of citizen-plaintiff suits
brought against a locality;153 the harmed would pay a proportionally
lower cost for any damages (rather than footing the entire bill as a city)
because the Fund would redistribute risk by collecting the tax across the
state. Furthermore, withdrawing resources from the Fund would be less
disruptive to the activities of a locality than an unexpected lawsuit,
particularly because a Fund, unlike an expansive lawsuit, is already
budgeted. Finally, administrative hearings regarding the Fund would
better serve the corrective justice of tort liability, as they could provide
compensatory damages to make the harmed whole utilizing expertise,
and without perverse effect.
The breadth of this policy can also address environmental justice
concerns. By collecting funds from water use across the state, poorer
localities, that might otherwise face hardship in meeting their responsi-
bilities due to lack of resources, will still be able to compensate their
community’s victims while they continue existing services.154 Those
harmed by water contamination will have the ability to recover from the
Fund regardless of race or economic class. The use of administrative
hearings will also reduce cost and procedural complexity for claimants,155
which could improve accessibility to compensation. Since 1977, roughly
ten to twenty percent of Disability Insurance and Supplement Security
Income claimants have proceeded completely without an attorney in
administrative hearings,156 although some argue this is unwise.157 A
government can also establish provisions to provide representation at the
hearings, assuming the cost is manageable for the state.
It is important to recognize that collecting this tax from a com-
modity such as water could harm poorer populations; because water is
152 See supra Section IV.A.
153 See supra Section IV.B.
154 Adam Babich, Environmental Justice in Louisiana, 51 LA. B.J. 90, 91 (2003) (discuss-
ing how part of environmental injustice is that costs are distributed unfairly on the poor
and minority communities).
155 McNeil, supra note 150, at 127.
156 Social Security Advisory Board, Aspects of Disability Decision Making: Data and
Materials, 60 (Feb. 2012) http://ssab.gov/Portals/0/OUR_WORK/REPORTS/Chartbook_As
pects%20of%20Disability%20Decision%20Making_2012.pdf?ver=2012-06-12-152148-000
[https://perma.cc/H3Z6-769E].
157 See generally Lisa Brodoff, Lifting Burdens: Proof, Social Justice, and Public Assistance
Administrative Hearings, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 131 (2008).
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a necessity, price has little effect on consumption, and thus the poor will
have minimal ability to avoid the tax.158 Therefore, the needs of the Fund
would have to find an equilibrium regarding efforts to keep the tax burden
low on low-income communities, possibly accomplished by providing hard-
ship exceptions or scaling the tax based on city income.
B. Analyzing the Water Contamination Fund Policy: Addressing
Potential Pitfalls and Determining Efficacy
The Fund avoids a few pitfalls of the other policy options. A public
fund enables victims to recover for their harm without relaxing sovereign
immunity and slowing down the state and local governments with litiga-
tion. Unlike the tax freeze policy, a public fund provides a real payout to
plaintiffs, without a substantial increase in the local tax burden; the cost
is spread across the entire state.
1. The Issue of Moral Hazard
One likely negative externality of this policy is moral hazard.
Moral hazard is the phenomena by which increasing protection against
a risk incentivizes riskier behavior in that area.159 For example, studies
showed that rates of dangerous driving and car accidents rose after drivers
acquired airbag-equipped cars.160 Although airbags reduced the number
of fatal accidents, the phenomena of moral hazard curbs the positive
effect on safety.161 The explanation for this phenomenon was that when
drivers felt protected by the airbags, they were less fearful of the conse-
quences of accidents, and intuitively drove more recklessly.162
In the context of a public water contamination liability, the Fund
separates the tortfeasor from the consequences of the payout and the
danger of risking harm. The Fund may incentivize a government or water
authority to take greater risks within their legally authorized discretion,
158 See S. T. Wong, A Model on Municipal Water Demand: A Case Study of Northeastern
Illinois, 48 LAND ECONOMICS, 34, 40–41 (1972) (describing analytics that show how price
has little effect on consumption of water).
159 See generally David Rowell & Luke B. Connelly, A History of the Term “Moral Hazard,”
79 J. RISK INS. 1051 (2012).
160 Steven P. Peterson & George E. Hoffer, The Impact of Airbag Adoption on Relative
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because each would know it will never have to pay for large scale mis-
takes. As part of implementing the Fund, legislatures should conduct a
regulatory and statutory review to ensure water authorities do not have
too much discretion to increase risk.
An examination of Michigan’s Underground Tank Storage Fund
program reveals the detriment of moral hazard. Michigan’s Fund became
insolvent in the 1990s.163 Michigan transitioned to a system in which
tank owners purchased their own insurance.164 During this time, technol-
ogy and improved practices were reducing the underground tank storage
leakage rates in many states, but Michigan’s rates improved 20% more
than adjacent states.165 The primary explanation for this reduction in
spill rates is the reduction of moral hazard; private insurance companies
charge clients based on risk.166 Underground tank storage owners paid
more each year for insurance for risky practices, and thus saved money
by taking greater precautions.167
This should not, however, suggest that the Fund would prove in-
efficient at mitigating accidents. The lesson from Michigan’s early public
fund is that the Fund should attempt to incentivize caution. One possible
mechanism for incentivizing caution can be borrowed from the National
Flood Insurance Program’s Community Rating System (“NFIP CRS”).168
Under NFIP CRS, as communities improve their flood management
beyond the minimum standards, the citizens receive reduced insurance
premiums for flood insurance.169 This can be adapted to the Fund by
designing a framework in which communities could complete certain
projects and decrease the risk of water contamination, in exchange for a
lower water usage tax rate on their citizens.
Furthermore, requiring localities to purchase private liability in-
surance would not address all dimensions of the Flint problem. Sovereign
immunity remains a barrier to lawsuits because even if the state consents
to suit as part of this program, the state with an appropriations clause
in its constitution can simply nullify the damages.170 Furthermore, liability
insurance does not provide the benefits of administrative hearings, which
163 Yin et al., supra note 144, at 332.
164 Id. at 341.
165 Id.
166 Id. at 344, 346–47.
167 Id.
168 See generally COMMUNITY RATING SYSTEMS, https://www.fema.gov/community-rating
-system [https://perma.cc/85UG-2DKG] (last visited Oct. 23, 2017).
169 Id.
170 See supra Section IV.A.2.
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would reduce costs and improve accessibility.171 Finally, a risk based pricing
model in a private insurance market would likely hamper environmental
justice concerns because the communities most in need of this program,
like Flint, are also the communities most at risk for water contamina-
tion,172 and thus would also pay the highest rates for private insurance.
Finally, the private option may be unnecessary because moral
hazard may be curbed by other existing frameworks, particularly crimi-
nal law. One primary function of criminal law, after all, is to prevent
harmful conduct.173 In the case of Flint, Michigan, numerous state and
local officials are currently facing criminal charges for their actions.174
This includes Darnell Early, the emergency manager who made the switch
to the contaminated Flint River, who is charged with false pretenses,
conspiracy, misconduct in office, and willful neglect of duty;175 false pre-
tenses and conspiracy are both 20-year felonies.176
Incentivizing caution with a framework similar to the NFIP CRS,
and enforcing existing criminal laws, should serve well to curb moral
hazard for the Fund.
2. Political Barriers
The greatest barrier to this program is likely political. There is
often great resistance to tax increases, particularly on services well liked
or utilized by political bases.177 Unfortunately, this policy will likely not
provide a salient benefit to wealthier tax payers. This policy protects
from an intangible risk of water contamination, which is higher for lower
income communities.178 This is a particularly noteworthy hurdle because
governments are motivated to provide services that benefit those who
171 McNeil, supra note 150, at 127, 130–31.
172 Michigan Civil Rights Commission, supra note 93, at 121 (stating the conditions of
Flint made a crisis “all but inevitable”).
173 See Paul H. Robinson, A Functional Analysis of Criminal Law, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 857
(1994).
174 Paul Egan & Elisha Anderson, New criminal charges in Flint water crisis, DETROIT





177 See Eric M. Zolt, Politics and Taxation: An Introduction, 67 TAX L. REV. 453, 455
(2014).
178 E.g., Michigan Civil Rights Commission, supra note 93, at 101.
354 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 42:331
pay the bulk of taxes.179 The benefit to the tax payers is security, but this
benefit may not be sufficiently worthwhile to wealthier tax payers to
enable legislation.
This program is further hampered by the fact that localities with
substantial tax bases already have a high level of water security; these
wealthier localities have more funds to monitor and repair water systems
and a larger budget with which to combat any problems when they do
arise.180 Conversely, the lower income localities who need this security
the most would have less resources to pay the tax than higher income
localities.181 The irony of this situation, that those who need the policy
the most are those least able to fund it, highlights the need for a state or
federal level program to distribute costs, but also serves as a potential
barrier to legislating this policy. This observation should display how
poverty can perpetuate environmental risks in communities most in need
of environmental justice.
Ultimately, the Fund can effectively protect precariously situated
localities that cannot bear the weight of a large class action suit for water
contamination, optimally monitor water system with their current bud-
get, or leverage sufficient funding to correct problems when they arise. As
such, the Fund will likely face resistance from those in more developed,
high income areas that are less at risk for the problems this policy solves.
Therefore, the tax should remain as small as possible while still main-
taining the solvency of the Fund, to reduce resistance against the program.
CONCLUSION
A Water Contamination Fund would solve many of the problems
facing Flint in the wake of their water crisis. The Fund would compen-
sate the harmed without the need for a civil lawsuit, circumventing the
barrier of sovereign immunity. This program spreads risk across the
entire state to reduce proportion of damages paid for by citizens’ taxes,
and to promote environmental justice by pulling Fund resources from
economically stable areas with potentially lower risks of water contami-
nation. Neither the “tax freeze,”182 nor the direct reduction of sovereign
179 Zolt, supra note 177, at 455 (citing Jeffrey F. Timmons, The Fiscal Contract: States,
Taxes, and Public Services, 57 WORLD POL. 530 (2005)).
180 Michigan Civil Rights Commission, supra note 93, at 101–02 (citing poverty as a
catalyst for the problems faced by Flint).
181 Id.
182 Supra, Section IV.B.
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immunity183 would address these problems without missing or exacerbat-
ing another.
Although a mandate requiring localities or water authorities to
purchase private insurance for contamination issues is tempting to avoid
moral hazard, such a program would 1) charge higher-risk communities
more, inhibiting environmental justice, 2) sidestep the procedural ease
and cost saving benefits of administrative hearings and 3) may be ham-
pered whenever damages are awarded by sovereign immunity and the
constitutional powers of the appropriations clause.
Ultimately, the Fund is an effective policy to restore Flint, Michi-
gan and communities like it, when government action hurts citizens.
183 Supra Section IV.A.
